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The Sphex story: How the cognitive sciences 




Faculty of Philosophy 




The Sphex story is an anecdote about a female digger wasp that at first sight seems to act 
quite intelligently, but subsequently is shown to be a mere automaton that can be made to 
repeat herself endlessly. Dennett and Hofstadter made this story well known and widely 
influential within the cognitive sciences where it is regularly used as evidence that insect 
behavior is highly rigid. The present paper discusses the origin and subsequent empirical 
investigation of the repetition reported in the Sphex story. The repetition was first observed by 
Henri Fabre in 1879 and the last empirical study I did find was published in 1985. In contrast 
to the story’s clear message, the actual results have always been equivocal: the endless 
repetition is not standard. In addition, this repetition itself has become a minor aside in the 
literature on digger wasps when put in the perspective of many other examples of 
adaptiveness and flexibility.  Nevertheless, the story and its message have to this day 
persevered within the cognitive sciences. For some reason, the counterevidence has been 
neglected time and again. The paper closes by presenting two different but compatible 
hypotheses that could explain why humans keep repeating this particular anecdote. 
 
 
Within the cognitive sciences, insects are generally viewed as having very limited cognitive 
powers: Insects do of course behave in ways that may seem to involve reasoning and 
intelligence. However, on closer acquaintance, such behavior turns out to be extremely 
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mechanistic. This general attitude toward the behavior of insects and other invertebrates has 
become perfectly exemplified as well as amplified by the widely dispersed Sphex story. Here 
is the version that became a classic of cognitive science, originally stemming from 
Wooldridge, but later repeatedly used by Dennett, Hofstadter and many others.  
 When the time comes for egg laying, the wasp Sphex builds a burrow for the 
purpose and seeks a cricket which she stings in such a way as to paralyze but 
not kill it. She drags the cricket into the burrow, lays her eggs alongside, closes 
the burrow, then flies away, never to return. In due course, the eggs hatch and 
the wasp grubs feed off the paralyzed cricket, which has not decayed, having 
been kept in the wasp equivalent of a deepfreeze. To the human mind, such an 
elaborately organized and seemingly purposeful routine conveys a convincing 
flavor of logic and thoughtfulness—until more details are examined. For 
example, the wasp’s routine is to bring the paralyzed cricket to the burrow, 
leave it on the threshold, go inside to see that all is well, emerge, and then drag 
the cricket in. If, while the wasp is inside making her preliminary inspection, 
the cricket is moved a few inches away, the wasp, on emerging from the 
burrow, will bring the cricket back to the threshold, but not inside, and will 
then repeat the preparatory procedure of entering the burrow to see that 
everything is all right. If again the cricket is removed a few inches while the 
wasp is inside, once again the wasp will move the cricket up to the threshold 
and re-enter the burrow for a final check. The wasp never thinks of pulling the 
cricket straight in. On one occasion this procedure was repeated forty times, 
always with the same result. (Wooldridge, 1963, pp. 82-83) 
The message is clear and simple. Behavior that seems to be strikingly intelligent is actually 
the result of a straightforward mechanical setup that involves a strict and rigid sequencing of 
 3 
environmental triggers to regulate the several steps involved. The insect is not at all aware of 
what it is doing and its internal processes are in this sense very different from the 
characteristics of human cognition. Hofstadter even coined the term ‘sphexish’ to refer to such 
an unknowing and mechanical form of ‘seeming intelligence,’ and set it as the “totally 
opposite to what we feel we are all about, particularly when we talk about our own 
consciousness” (1985, p. 529). Dennett used this notion to refer to the possibility that we 
might be sphexish ourselves, only less obviously so, and investigated possible implications 
for free will. The general idea here is that, if this rigidity of behavior is true for insects as a 
fundamental property that can be uncovered under the right circumstances, then the same 
should apply to the more complex but not intrinsically different case of human beings. 
 In this paper, I will sketch the history of the Sphex story, focusing on what I will call 
the cricket test as described in the quote. This test and the resulting ‘endless’ repeat can be 
traced back to the work of Henri Fabre, who first reported this finding in 1879. Since then this 
particular behavior has been studied repeatedly by other students of insect behavior. They 
performed the cricket test on various species of digger wasp, such as Sphex species, but also 
Ammophila species that prey mostly on caterpillars. Looking at this history, there are several 
striking features. First and foremost, digger wasps very often do not repeat themselves 
endlessly when the cricket test is done. After a few trials many wasps take the cricket into 
their burrow without the visit. Second, in certain cases there are ecological and practical 
reasons for repeating the visit. Third, the cricket test focuses on an extremely minor 
component of digger wasp behavior, which has since its discovery been completely swamped 
by many other findings that provide a very different general picture of the mind of the digger 
wasp. Finally, it is very striking that the equivocal results of the cricket test have been and 
still are systematically ignored or downplayed. The factual findings seem to have less impact 
than the clear-cut but fanciful mechanistic image the story evokes. 
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 The Sphex story does not tell us much about digger wasps. But the human repetition of 
the story over such a long period should teach us something important about our own 
tendencies when it comes to the interpretation of basic forms of behavior. I will give two 
mutually supportive hypotheses that may help explain why it is so difficult for us not to repeat 
this anecdote. At a theoretical level, the Sphex story is useful to argue both for and against the 
presence of deep differences between the human mind and the intelligence of insect-like 
animals. In addition, the story seems so striking because it plays on the general human 
capacity to differentiate agents from non-agents in an automatic way. The second hypothesis 
in particular, provides an explanation why the story is so catchy and seems to convey a 
special insight, as stressed by Hofstadter.  
 
 
1 The Sphex story’s dispersal in cognitive science 
The Sphex story has been widely dispersed within the cognitive sciences, spreading the 
message that insect intelligence is very basic and mechanical. This dispersal was achieved 
mainly through the efforts of Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett. In 1982, Hofstadter 
gave the story a wide hearing when he quoted Wooldridge in his mathematical column in 
Scientific American (republished in Hofstadter, 1985), calling it “One of my favorite 
passages” (1985, p. 529). Dennett quoted Wooldridge for the first time in 1973 as an example 
of a mechanistic explanation which did not involve an intentional explanation (p.171). This 
paper was reprinted in Brainstorms (Dennett, 1978), where the full quote was skipped as it 
already appeared in a different paper in the same volume. In his 1984 book Elbow Room, 
Dennett gives a lot of prominence to the Sphex story. He quotes Wooldridge (1963) again in 
full and then uses Hofstadter’s notion of sphexishness to describe one of our major fears when 
it comes to free will: We may ourselves be sphexish and only seemingly free agents, just like 
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the poor wasp in the story. The story and ‘sphexish’ occur repeatedly after this introduction. 
The same Wooldridge quote occurs yet again in Dennett (1998), in a reprint of his 1984 paper 
Cognitive wheels: The frame problem in AI. Dennett still referred to the story in his book 
Freedom Evolves where it is mentioned in passing as an established fact: 
 In these models, the individual organisms are stipulated to be old dogs that can’t learn 
new tricks and are stuck as lifetime cooperators or defectors. […] This is not much of 
an oversimplification if you’re dealing with insects, whose behavioral routines are 
relatively rigid and tropistic (or sphexish, to use the term Douglas Hofstadter coined in 
honor of the Sphex wasp). (Dennett, 2003, p. 198) 
Thus Dennett has used or referred to the Sphex story repeatedly over a period of 30 years, 
making the story widely available within the cognitive science community.  
 The clear message and its wide dispersal by Dennett and Hofstadter has resulted in the 
story popping up far and wide as a factual statement that unmasks unwarranted assumptions 
concerning insect intelligence and that underpins the ‘fact’ of the rigidity of insect behavior. 
In 2009, googling ‘Sphex’ combined with ‘Dennett’ or ‘Hofstadter’ gave 967 pages (August 
13), including the following description in Wikipedia:  
This iteration can be repeated again and again, with the Sphex never seeming to notice 
what is going on, never able to escape from its programmed sequence of behaviors. 
Dennett's argument quotes an account of Sphex behavior from Wooldridge's 
Machinery of the Brain (1963). Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett have used this 
mechanistic behavior as an example of how seemingly thoughtful behavior can 
actually be quite mindless, the opposite of free will (or, as Hofstadter described it, 
antisphexishness). 
This same text is repeated on many other places on the web when one searches for wasps. In 
addition, the story occurs in many published works within the cognitive sciences and the 
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philosophy of cognition (e.g. Brooks, 2002; Carruthers, 2004; Double, 1988; Elton, 2003; 
Fogel, 2000; Franklin, 1995; Millikan, 2004; Newen & Bartels, 2007; Newman, 2001; 
Stephan, 1999; Sterelny, 1990).  
 To rub in how the Sphex story has shaped the minds of many workers within the 
cognitive sciences, here are some conclusions phrased by some of these authors. Sterelny 
(1990. p. 20) says:  “Sphex has a single, invariable behaviour pattern. … Wasps aren’t very 
thoughtful.” Fogel (2000, p. 284) notes: “nothing more than an automatic reflex, genetically 
hardcoded behavior. It’s just like a calculator that adds 10 plus 10.” Millikan (2004, p. 169) 
writes: “The wasp seems not to understand the purpose of its own activity so as to know when 
that purpose has been accomplished.” Stephan (1999, pp. 83-84) remarks: “Even among 
philosophers, sphex has become famous through a number of articles by Daniel Dennett.” and 
“spheges appear dim-witted within the unnatural experimental setting . Neither do they mind 
nor do they remember – there is no learning.” Carruthers (2004) states: “The wasp appears to 
have no conception of the overall goal of the sequence, nor any beliefs about the respective 
contributions made by the different elements.” Finally, Elton (2003, p. 135) claims that: “All 
Sphex wasps can be caught out by the experimenter who moves the cricket away from the 
burrow entrances.” In all cases the story is accepted without questioning and considered to 
represent a general fact about the behavior of Sphex wasps. 
 All in all, one can conclude that the Sphex story has become part and parcel of the 
general knowledge of the cognitive science community, and has been an important factor in 
shaping the views of many researchers concerning the presumed rigidity of insect 
intelligence. Intriguingly, within the cognitive sciences neither the story, nor its message has 
been seriously investigated. Its truth is taken at face value with always the same single quote 
from Wooldridge as its source. However, given the wide influence of the Sphex story, it is 
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important to check its credentials and establish whether it really tells us something important 
about these wasps, leave alone insects in general. 
 
 
2 Moving through the Wooldridge barrier 
As everyone within the cognitive sciences refers directly or indirectly to Wooldridge as its 
source, the first question is: Where did Dean Wooldridge pick up the story? Wooldridge was 
not a biologist, nor in any other way involved in the study of insects. He had a background in 
engineering, co-founded the aerospace technology Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation in 1953, 
and from 1962 onward devoted himself to scientific pursuits and writing. The Machinery of 
the Brain was a first result and an attempt to provide a readable introduction to some of the 
then recent developments in brain research (Wooldridge, 1963, p. i). In contrast to Dennett, 
Hofstadter refers to another book by the same Wooldridge (1968, p. 70). However, the key 
quote is identical in both cases, except for three minor textual changes. Wooldridge (1963) 
doesn’t explicitly say from which source he took the Sphex story. However, at the end of the 
relevant chapter he gives a general list of references, and in one of these the story can be 
found: the huge, two volume book The Science of Life written by H.G. Wells, Julian Huxley 
and G.P. Wells. This is what they say: 
The instinctive and machine-like quality of most of their behaviour was clearly shown 
by some experiments of Fabre on the wasp Sphex, which hunts crickets. When the 
Sphex has brought a paralyzed cricket to her burrow, she leaves it on the threshold, 
goes inside for a moment, apparently to see that all is well, emerges, and drags the 
cricket in. While the wasp was inside, Fabre moved the cricket a few inches away. The 
wasp came out, fetched the cricket back to the threshold, and went inside again—on 
which Fabre moved again the cricket away. He repeated the procedure forty times, 
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always with the same result; the wasp never thought of pulling the cricket straight in. 
Drag cricket to the threshold—pop in—pop out—pull cricket in: the sequence of 
actions seems to be like a set of cog-wheels, each arranged to set the next one going, 
but permitting of no variation. (Wells, Huxley & Wells, 1931, p. 1161) 
This is exactly the story that is retold later by Wooldridge and which has resulted in the 
familiar picture of the mechanistic character of the wasp’s behavior, but now with the name of 
Fabre included as the originator of the story. However, and remarkably, this same paragraph 
goes on without any interruption and ends in the following way: 
The Peckhams repeated the experiment with an American Sphex. This creature was 
not quite so automatic, for after her prey had been moved a number of times, she did 
drag it straight into her burrow. (ibid.) 
Thus, not only the Sphex story is present in Wooldridge’s source, but so is a later trial with the 
cricket test with the opposite result. The claim concerning the extreme rigidity of Sphex has 
already been challenged and disconfirmed by someone else. 
 Both Fabre and the Peckhams are well-known for their studies of insect behavior in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. I will discuss their work at some length to get 
a grasp of the facts that gave rise to their respective claims. However, before turning to them, 
it is important to articulate how Wooldridge’s treatment of the Sphex story encouraged its 
later dispersal within cognitive science. First, he turned the story into the unequivocal 
message that all sphexes behave in this particular way, a message that was not present in his 
source text that did mention the Peckhams’ different result. Second, he brought the story that 
was already well-known among naturalists to the attention of a new type of reader, those 
working in fields like control theory, engineering neural circuits and what became eventually 
the cognitive and computational neurosciences. This audience would know very little about 
insect behavior and would not be inclined to read up on this story or do further investigations. 
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Third, he left out Fabre’s name, which not only robbed Fabre of the credit he deserves for 
devising the cricket test, but which also made the story more difficult to trace and check, in 
particular for his cognitive science audience who generally would never have heard of Fabre 
or the Peckhams. 
 With this, all was set to launch the catchy Sphex story to its current influence within 
the cognitive sciences. The idea of an endlessly repeating behavior was very suggestive of a 
computational subroutine and a clear target for a computational explanation.  
 To the computer scientist, there must be a sense of familiarity to this type of behavior. 
It has the earmarks of a set of subroutines recorded in the permanent memory system 
of a computer and called into play by the appearance of certain conditions of the input 
data. (Wooldridge, 1963, p. 83) 
The message of an endless repeat made it possible to draw a clear link between insect 
behavior and computational procedures. Wooldridge used this link between computational 
procedures and the organizing principles behind animal behavior as a foothold for a fully 
mechanistic approach of the human brain: Intelligence, including human intelligence, can be 
produced by mechanical—that is computational—means. In this tendency he was later 
followed by Hofstadter and Dennett, and many others in cognitive science.  
 
 
3 Fabre’s original experiment and later findings 
Henri Fabre (1823-1915) was an important French field biologist and science writer, “whose 
life-long study of the insects remains a marvel of indefatigable labor and detailed 
observation.” (Warden, 1927, p. 148), and who Charles Darwin referred to as the “inimitable 
observer” (Pasteur, 1994). Fabre in turn was a staunch anti-Darwinian who believed that God 
created each species and its behavior, and who used his studies to argue against the idea that 
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evolution had taken place. From his early retirement around 1871 until his death in 1915 
Fabre devoted all his time to writing, observing nature and experimenting with insects 
(Pasteur, 1994). This research resulted in a series of essays eventually constituting the ten 
volumes of his widely read Souvenirs Entomologiques, published between 1879 and 1904. 
The Sphex story can be found in the first volume of the Souvenirs, in a chapter dedicated to 
the yellow-winged Sphex or Sphex flavipennis, as Fabre calls it. The relevant essay is 
translated in The Hunting Wasps, a book first published in 1915 that is still in press today 
(Fabre, 1915/2001).  
 I will mention an experiment which interested me greatly. Here are the particulars: at 
the moment when the Sphex is making her domiciliary visit, I take the Cricket left at 
the entrance to the dwelling and place her a few inches farther away. The Sphex 
comes up, utters her usual cry, looks here and there in astonishment and, seeing the 
game too far off, comes out of her hole to seize it and bring it back to its right place. 
Having done this, she goes down again, but alone. I play the same trick upon her; and 
the Sphex has the same disappointment on her arrival at the entrance. The victim is 
once more dragged back to the edge of the hole, but the Wasp always goes down 
alone; and this goes on as long as my patience is not exhausted. Time after time, forty 
times over, did I repeat the same experiment on the same Wasp; her persistence 
vanquished mine and her tactics never varied. (Fabre, 1915/2001, p. 43) 
All familiar ingredients are present, up to the tell tale number of forty. However, the text 
offers some additional surprises. A few lines further Fabre writes the following (bear in mind 
that these wasps are solitary but still make their separate burrows in colonies, like sea gulls): 
 Having demonstrated the same inflexible obstinacy which I have just described in the 
case of all the Sphex-wasps on whom I cared to experiment in the same colony, I 
continued to worry my head over it for some time. What I asked myself was this: 
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“Does the insect obey a fatal tendency, which no circumstance can ever modify? Are 
its actions all performed by rule; and has it no power of acquiring the least experience 
on its own account?” [… ] good fortune brought me into the presence of another 
colony of Sphex-wasps, in a district at some distance from the first. I recommenced 
my attempts. After two or three experiments with results similar to those which I had 
so often obtained, the Sphex got astride of the Cricket, seized him with her mandibles 
by the antennae and at once dragged him into the burrow. […] At the other holes, her 
neighbours likewise, one sooner, another later, discovered my treachery and entered 
the dwelling with the game, instead of persisting in abandoning it on the threshold to 
seize it afterwards. […] Next day, in a different locality, I repeated my experiment 
with another Cricket; and every time the Sphex was hoodwinked. I had come upon a 
dense-minded tribe, a regular village of Boeotians, as in my first observations. (Fabre, 
1915/2001, pp. 43-44) 
Remember that this is the original source of the Sphex story. Fabre, the inventor of the cricket 
test, did this test repeatedly with different wasps. But in contrast to the currently popular 
version his results were equivocal. He reported an indefinite repetition in wasps from certain 
colonies, but not in wasps of the same species from other colonies. Thus, from the very start 
the actual results were not as clear-cut or universal as the widely circulated story holds. 
 In another chapter—Ignorance de l’instinct—of the same volume, Fabre returns to the 
behavior described in the Sphex story. He discusses here the issue of misfiring instincts, of 
which the Sphex story is but one example. Instincts, he concludes, are perfectly adapted under 
natural conditions but are incapable of coping with artificial conditions, as induced by a 
human experimenter (1879, p. 179). In this chapter, he states that his results with the cricket 
test for another species, Sphex albisecta, conform fully to those of the original yellow-winged 
Sphex flavipennis and then draws an interesting conclusion: 
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 Let us recall here that the Yellow-winged Sphex does not always allow herself to be 
caught by this trick of pulling away her Cricket. There are picked tribes, strong-
minded families which, after a few disappointments, see through the experimenter’s 
wiles and know how to baffle them. But these revolutionaries, fit subjects for progress, 
are the minority; the remainder, mulish conservatives clinging to the old manners and 
customs, are the majority, the crowd. (Fabre, 1915/2001, pp. 116-117) 
Fabre does not say why he concludes that the indefinite repetition is the normal case, while 
the smarter wasps are merely an exception. However, this conclusion fits his general view that 
insect behavior results from instinctive mechanisms and not from any reasoning capacities. In 
any case, here at the very origin of the Sphex story, the available counterevidence is set aside 
as the aberration.  
 What subsequently spread out from Fabre’s work was the Sphex story as we know it 
today, without reference to his more equivocal results (e.g. Romanes, 1886; Peckham & 
Peckham, 1898; Morgan, 1900; Wells, Huxley & Wells, 1931), although there are also 
exceptions (e.g. Bierens de Haan, 1940). 
 
 
4 The Peckhams’ controversy with Fabre 
Not everyone did passively accept Fabre’s conclusion concerning the Sphex story. George and 
Elizabeth Peckham were two well known American entomologists who worked around 1900. 
In their preface of Instincts and Habits of Solitary Wasps (1898) they state that reading 
Fabre’s Souvenirs Entomologiques inspired them to study the solitary wasps, such as Sphex, 
for themselves (1898, p. 1). They explicitly say here that they respect Fabre’s work very 
much, even though their conclusions are markedly different (ibid.). A discussion of the habits 
of Ammophila, a genus of digger wasps with habits similar to those of Sphex, illustrates these 
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differences. Fabre claims that their instincts are perfectly adapted and can “never have varied 
to any appreciable extent from the beginning of time,” because any deviation would mean 
extinction (Peckham & Peckham, 1898, pp. 30; 1905
1
, p. 52). To this the Peckhams reply: 
 The conclusions that we draw from the study of this genus differ in the most striking 
manner from those of Fabre. The one preeminent, unmistakable and ever present fact 
is variability. Variability in every particular—in the shape of the nest and the manner 
of digging it, in the condition of the nest (whether closed or open) when left 
temporarily, in the method of stinging the prey, [etc.] (1898, p. 30, 1905, p. 53) 
Fabre’s account of the Sphex must have piqued them, as the implied rigidity and sheer lack of 
variability is very much contrary to their own Darwinian perspective and general observations 
of insect behavior. 
 The Peckhams did their own follow up of the cricket test with an American digger 
wasp Sphex ichneumonea, which preys on grasshoppers. In 1900 they reported their finding in 
a short two page paper and later in a popular book (Peckham & Peckham, 1905). Here they 
used these findings as their closing statement. After describing the Sphex story—using the 
same text as in 1898—they describe their own experience with the cricket test: 
 On the following day, when she had brought a grasshopper to the entrance of the nest, 
and while she was below, we moved it back five or six inches. When she came out, 
she carried it to the same spot and went down as before. We removed it again, with the 
same result, and the performance was repeated a third and a fourth time, but the fifth 
time that she had found her prey where we had placed it she seized it by the head, and 
going backward dragged it down into the nest without pausing. On the next day the 
experiment was repeated. After we had moved the grasshopper away four times, she 
carried it into the nest, going head foremost. On the fourth and last day of our 
                                                          
1
 The Peckhams reused portions of their more scholarly 1898 book in their Wasps, social and solitary, published 
in 1905 for a wider audience. Many of the references to the 1898 book can also be found there, which will be 
indicated by a double reference. 
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experiment, she replaced the grasshopper at the door of the nest and ran inside seven 
times, but then seized it and dragged it in, going backward. (Peckham & Peckham, 
1905, pp. 304-305) 
Despite a tendency to stick to the standard procedure and to repeat itself, this wasp did modify 
its behavior after a few trials. Like Fabre’s original story, this opposing finding by the 
Peckhams also became widely spread in the literature on digger wasps, starting with Lloyd 
Morgan (1900) and eventually finding its way to the text by Wells, Huxley and Wells (1931) 
from which Woodridge drew his version.  
 From here on, the Peckhams became portrayed as the standard antagonists of Fabre: 
He being the defender of the God-given and eternal fixity of instinct, they the defenders of a 
Darwinist view who claimed and reported the presence of variability of almost all aspects of 
insect behavior. For a while, Fabre and the Peckhams were even regularly cited within 
psychological texts (e.g. Boring, 1921; McDougall, 1928). The fixity of insect behavior was 
here treated as a matter of discussion, not a matter of fact. The story that was later dispersed 
in the cognitive sciences took up only one part of this discussion and was ultimately based on 
the single report of Henri Fabre.  
 It can be concluded that the scientific foundation for the Sphex story as told within the 
cognitive sciences is extremely weak. However, it is possible that additional studies on the 
cricket test have settled this matter in a way that generally supports the message of the 
modern Sphex story. Even when those later studies never played any role in establishing the 
story, they may still support the Sphex story’s current standing as a representative account of 
digger wasp behavior. Therefore an important issue remains: What happened to the cricket 




5 The Sphex story in Baerends classic ethological studies 
In the 1930s, ethology established itself by introducing more refined methods to study animal 
behavior in the wild (e.g. systematic experimentation, note taking, marking individuals). The 
resulting studies provided answers to questions that remained unresolved by the earlier 
pioneers. For example, Tinbergen and his co-workers discovered how bee-wolves – a large 
digger wasp that preys on honey bees –orient themselves and find their nests on the basis of 
salient visual clues, how they find their prey and so on (Tinbergen, 1974). While ethology 
thus set new methodological (and also theoretical standards) for research, both Fabre and the 
Peckhams are named as an important source of inspiration and information by these later 
ethologists (e.g. Baerends, 1941; Crompton, 1948; Tinbergen, 1974; O’Neill, 2001). The 
older observations provided a starting point for experimental questions and the controversy 
between Fabre and the Peckhams – of which the Sphex story is a key example – did carry on 
inside ethology as the fixity versus variability debate (Evans, 1966). How was the Sphex story 
treated in this more rigorous scientific context? 
 The sophisticated studies performed in the late 1930s, early 1940s by Tinbergen’s 
student Baerends, together with the later Mrs. Baerends, (Tinbergen, 1974; Baerends, 1941) 
provide a good example. The Baerendses investigated the species Ammophila  campestris 
Jur., later renamed as A. adriaansei. A. adriaansei is fairly small and uses several small 
caterpillars to feed her developing larva. These caterpillars are provided over several days to 
avoid the risks of their drying out or getting mouldy (Teschner, 1959). By marking the 
individual wasps, the Baerendses discovered that this nesting behavior consists of three 
phases. In a first phase, the wasp digs a burrow, provisions it with a single caterpillar, lays her 
egg, locks it provisionally and works on another nest. After one or a few days, she revisits the 
nest without a caterpillar and later brings in one or two, locking the nest and working on 
another nest. After another day, in a third phase, she returns again without a caterpillar for an 
 16 
inspection, brings in a final collection of three, four or even more caterpillars, bolts the door 
and never returns. By using artificial plaster nest that allowed the counting and manipulation 
of the number of caterpillars in the nest, the Baerendses could show that the ‘inspections’ 
really were inspections, the wasp taking stock of the growth of the larva and the number of 
caterpillars left. The inspection allowed the wasp to adapt its provisioning behavior to these 
variable factors, an effect lasting through the day and even the day after. 
 In addition to these findings, the Baerendses investigated many other aspects of the 
behavior of A. adriaansei, such as the visual cues they used to find their nests, but also more 
basic elements of behavior, such as those involved in the details of nest building and 
provisioning. In a section called “Drawing in the caterpillar” (Baerends, 1941, pp. 96-105) 
Baerends reports his findings with the cricket test, here done with caterpillars. Baerends 
describes the wasp’s behavior as a behavioral chain, each link being the normal precondition 
for the next: Moving forwards the wasp brings the caterpillar to the side of the burrow leaving 
it there, the wasp then digs and moves inside the burrow head first, then she moves out 
backwards, turns around above ground and positions her abdomen above the opening her head 
facing into the direction she left her caterpillar. Normally she then grabs her prey dragging it 
in backward. By displacing the caterpillar Baerends could initiate a repeat of up to twenty 
times (p.97). However, ultimately the wasp abandons the digging and moving inside, releases 
the caterpillar only for an instant to turn round, then grabs it again and drags it inside moving 
backwards.  
 Baerends interprets his findings in terms of a theory of hierarchically organized 
behavioral chains to explain both the flexibility and rigidity observed. Roughly, the story is 
that insects, as well as other animals, have a complex hierarchy of internal states 
(Stimmungen). When under the influence of such an internal state, or Stimmung, the animal 
performs actions that belong to this Stimmung but not others. In case of the cricket test, the 
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active Stimmung of ‘drawing in the caterpillar’ would predispose the insect to repeat itself, 
but some adaptation is possible by switching to other behaviors that also belong to the same 
Stimmung. The fixity in the cricket test is comparatively strong because ‘drawing in the 
caterpillar’ is a low-level Stimmung, leaving open only a limited number of motor options for 
changing the behavior. In his general discussion on the variability of action, Baerends notes in 
his conclusion that both fixity and variability are present in digger wasps, but immediately 
stresses that often there is only a ‘seeming variability,’ which is not an innate variability but 
can be explained by the local circumstances under which the behavior is performed, like 
orientation towards stimuli as in taxis. Baerends seemingly tends to interpret (insect) behavior 
as fixed, but leaves the issue with the remark that systematic empirical research will be 
necessary in order to decide (1941, pp. 213ff.).  
 For the Sphex story, two things are important to this report. First, there is the down to 
earth fact that Baerends found a repetition of twenty times before the wasps managed to 
escape from their loop. Compared to Fabre and the Peckhams this is an in between case, the 
repetition being long but not endless. It is not a straightforward support (nor refutation) of the 
standard message of the Sphex story that the behavior is fixed. Second, Baerends study is 
important for putting the cricket test in its proper perspective. This study became a widely 
cited classic of ethology because it established how A. adriaansei could memorize the state of 
each of several nests for extended periods on the basis of a single inspection. This discovery, 
together with many others, made clear that insect behavior was largely unknown territory that 
was full of surprises and that needed a lot of further research to get a more even handed 
understanding of it. In the many later studies on increasingly detailed and diverse aspects of 
insect behavior (e.g. Baerends, 1959; O’Neill, 2001), the cricket test no longer plays a 
significant role. However, there are still a few later reports on the cricket test. Interestingly, 




6 Teschner’s study of the fixity–variability question 
While the cricket test and its implications play a minor role in Baerends text, a later as well as 
more focused and in depth study of this issue is provided by Walter Teschner (1959). 
Teschner starts by observing that the early reports on the behavior of digger wasps are not 
sufficiently trustworthy and precise and better methods are required. He refers to Fabre and 
the Peckhams as the origins of the fixity versus variability issue and, while using Baerends’ 
methods, takes issue with his conclusion that fixity seems to be the more general case. 
Teschner confirms Baerends’ maximum of a twenty times repeat with A. adriaansei before 
the wasp escapes from its loop (p.454). However he also investigates a different species, 
Ammophila sabulosa, with different results.  
 Teschner describes how A. sabulosa shows two different ways of drawing in the 
caterpillar. In the first, after leaving the caterpillar at the doorstep, the wasp enters her burrow 
head first, turns inside and comes out head first, grabs her prey and drags it in. With the 
second method, the wasp comes out the nest backwards and turns around above ground, like 
A. adriaansei. Doing the cricket test with wasps accustomed to the first method, Teschner 
comes to a repeat of no more than three or four times (p.456). He also stresses that the 
repetition of going inside the burrow is not superfluous in this case: The wasp uses this going 
in to turn around and position herself. To pass the cricket test these wasps have to learn a new 
behavior, turn at the tunnel entrance. Teschner stresses that in older reports of the cricket test, 
like Fabre’s, it remains unclear whether the investigated Sphex did use the ‘visit’ to turn round 
inside the nest, which would provide some explanation for its perseverance. The group of A. 
sabulosa that uses the above ground turn can also be made to repeat itself with the cricket test, 
however also only for a maximum of three to four times before the diving into the burrow 
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drops out and the wasp makes a fast turn (p.457). Another report by Teschner is a single trial 
with a Podalinia affinis wasp, which also turns inside the nest. This wasp persevered in 
turning inside the nest, leading to a 15 times repeat before it came up very fast, grabbed the 
caterpillar before Teschner could reposition it ending the experiment (p.459). 
 Teschner’s discussion not only brings in new observations with another species but 
also additional features that may be relevant for explaining the repetition induced by the 
cricket test. His noting that the ‘superfluous’ visit may in various cases be a functional part of 
a wasp’s turning behavior is one. The regular presence of parasites is another possibly 
relevant fact that could provide a functional explanation for the tendency to keep repeating the 
inspection. Another interesting feature is the behavior of wasps that make their burrows on 
sandy slopes where the cricket test tends to occur naturally as caterpillars often slide down the 
slope. Teschner provides here an ‘anti-Sphex story’ with his observation of wasp #91. This 
wasp brings up her caterpillar to the nest opening on a steep slope six times. Each time she 
tries but does not succeed in grabbing it fast enough when she turns around on the nest 
opening. The seventh time, she grabs the caterpillar not at its front end but in the middle, 
drags it up till it is positioned above the nest opening and turns around while braking the 
caterpillar with her legs, grabs it and draws it in (p.458). Not all wasps are incapable of 
adapting their behavior and do new things is Teschner’s message here. 
 Like Baerends, Teschner finally concludes that the insects studied show both a lot of 
fixity as well as variability in their behavior. The main difference is that Teschner tends to 
stress the variability present in many of the animals studied, while Baerends has a tendency to 
stress fixity, possibly because this fits his (Lorenzian and Tinbergian) theoretical scheme on 
innate determinants of behavior better. To conclude, early ethologists were well acquainted 
with Fabre’s cricket test, which was studied more systematically and in more detail than 
before. While the early positions of Fabre and the Peckhams became cast as the paradigm 
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cases of behavioral fixity and behavioral variability in the ensuing debate it became clear that 
either position was too strong, or at the very least required more empirical research in order to 
be established (Baerends, 1941).  
 
 
7 The Sphex story in later behavioral studies 
Teschner’s study is already fifty years old and since then the number of ethological and other 
field studies on solitary wasps has expanded enormously (see e.g. O’Neill, 2001) making it 
increasingly difficult to get an overview of later research that specifically tackles the behavior 
described in the Sphex story. Thus, without any claims of being exhaustive, I want to finish by 
briefly mentioning a few more recent studies on the variability of behavior in digger wasps.  
 For example, Steiner (1971), while not reporting on the cricket test itself, tests the 
wasp Liris nigra, in their response to unusual situations and concludes that these wasps can 
initiate new kinds of behavior under the proper circumstance. He also says, “The fixity of 
both the activities and of their succession seems, however, to have been overestimated or 
overemphasized.” (p.1401) Ribi and Ribi (1979) refer to Fabre’s claims concerning the fixity 
of the cricket test and report a similar repetition for Sphex cognatus, but only “several times 
before the wasp will grasp her prey and proceed directly into the whole.” (p.698) 
 A wonderfully sophisticated and extensive report on the cricket test derives from a 
five year study done by Jane Brockman (1985). The cricket test was only one aspect of this 
study, discussed under the name of “prey-retrieval behavior.” First she discusses six natural 
reasons why the prey of Sphex ichneumoneus may be missing when the wasp reappears from 
the nest. Subsequently she describes the results of the cricket test performed systematically on 
31 wasps. For each wasp, she used 15 different places for repositioning the prey, positioned at 




 position being the place where the wasp left her prey herself. Brockman 
placed the prey at each of the 15 non-standard positions in random order, and then finished by 
placing it in the normal position, from which the wasp always drew it in. Twelve wasps came 
to the end of the full procedure, repeating the visit fifteen times. Ten wasps drew the prey in 
from another position, breaking the loop. Of the remainder, five gave up searching for their 
missing prey while four did not finish for other reasons. In a retest with fourteen wasps, four 
wasps remained stuck in their loop, while five broke out if it (pp. 639-641). In her discussion, 
where she also takes into account many other findings concerning the provisioning behavior 
of the great golden digger, Brockmann says: 
Although the behavior generally follows one scheme, there are many situations that 
arise and the wasps behave in an adaptive manner towards each … The fixity of 
repeatedly repositioning and reentering the nest is almost certainly an adaptive 
response to prey that can easily become lodged in the nest if pulled in backwards. 
(p.651) 
And as a final concluding remark: 
The adaptable provisioning behavior of Sphex ichneumoneus would be surprising to 
anyone who viewed insect behavior as stereotyped and fixed. The versatility of 
individuals extended to all phases of their behavior, from the habitats in which they 
hunted, to the types of prey captured, to the behavior used in getting the prey into the 
brood cell. Where responses show stereotypy, such as in repeated prey retrievals, there 
is an obvious, adaptive explanation. I suspect that long-term studies of known 
individuals in other species of insects would similarly reveal the same kind of adaptive 
behavioral versatility. (p.652) 
This message couldn’t be further removed from the one conveyed by the Sphex story that 
became part of cognitive science folklore. It is also based on rigorous research and an intimate 
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8 Discussion: The human loop 
Having seen its origins, its reception, and later research, it must be concluded that the Sphex 
story as it is known within cognitive science provides a misleadingly one-sided description of 
wasp behavior. The empirical findings have been equivocal from the very start, giving rise to 
a long standing debate on the fixedness and variability of insect behavior, a debate that never 
received a conclusive empirical ending. None of the behavioral scientists in the last hundred 
years who investigated this particular issue would claim that wasp behavior is completely 
fixed (as many cognitive scientists currently tend to think; see section 1), nor that it is 
completely variable of course. Insect behavior in general varies widely, involving many 
instances of remarkable intelligence, as well as cases that are less so. And even when some 
individual wasps succumb to the cricket test’s repeat, this cannot be taken as evidence for the 
fixity of insect behavior more generally (Griffin, 1992).  
 While the Sphex story does not teach us a lot about insect behavior, the real interest of 
the Sphex story might lie somewhere else: The tenacity of the story might teach us something 
important about human thought and behavior. The interesting fact is not so much the 
presumed endless repetition made by the wasp, but the endless repetition of humans retelling 
the story as a matter of significance despite all the available counterevidence.  
 The Sphex story is not merely an empirical finding like many others but a finding that 
seems to be particularly intriguing to humans. The story is taken as a special source of insight 
when it comes to insect behavior, making it “totally opposite to what we feel we are all about, 
particularly when we talk about our own consciousness” as Hofstadter phrased it (see above). 
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The strong impression left by the Sphex story and the endless repetition is not taken in as 
mere information – compare it for that matter to the specific but rather dry results of 
Brockmann’s experiments on prey retrieval. The cricket test seems to be an eye opening 
phenomenon that teaches us something deep about the wasps that are described.  
 Fabre himself thought the original finding remarkable and so did the Peckhams. After 
them, the cricket test issue remained alive in the behavioral literature till, at least, 1985 
gradually becoming less prominent in the context of the general rise of knowledge on insect 
behavior. Wooldridge in 1963 in turn must have thought the similarities of the repetition to 
computational routines sufficiently strong to focus on the repetition and to ignore the 
counterevidence. Later, without the counterevidence or its proper context, the Sphex story was 
evocative enough to spread widely as providing an important and general insight on insect 
behavior. Even very recently, knowledge of the empirical background of the story does not 
seem to be sufficient for some researchers to resist using it as an illustration of the presumed 
rigidity of insect behavior. For example, in their discussion of the difference between 
noncognitive and cognitive information, Newen and Bartels use the Sphex story to illustrate 
this difference even when they are aware of the Peckhams findings. In a footnote they write: 
 In recent work it is questioned whether the description of the behavior of the Sphex is 
adequately evaluated as a rigid behavioral program (Keijzer, 2001). But even if that 
example cannot play its role here the general idea is clear enough. (Newen & Bartels, 
2007, p. 306) 
One may wonder here whether cognitive issues should be settled by finding proper examples 
that fit existing theories or whether theories should be developed that deal adequately and 
systematically with the findings that nature provides. 
 Why is the Sphex story so persistent? Why does it have such a strong influence on 
human students of mind and behavior? I will finish by mentioning two different, although not 
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mutually exclusive, hypotheses for the human repetition of the story. First, the story fits in 
nicely with both dualist and materialist views on the mind, and is used to prop either side. 
Second, at an intuitive level the story can be said to act as a switching device that at a highly 
intuitive and salient level enforces a change in the subjective interpretation of this wasp, 
suddenly turning it from a genuine agent into a mere mechanism.  
 The first possible explanation derives from the way in which we humans tend to make 
– or deny – a fundamental difference between mind and matter. The Sphex story is relevant in 
this context because it can be cast as providing a case that is congenial to both sides: What 
initially seems like a sign of mind in insects is suddenly shown to be a mere mechanism. This 
demasking is actually usuful to both dualists and materialists. Dualists – like Fabre – use the 
example to argue that despite the appearance of intelligence, insect intelligence is ultimately 
only an instinct and not a sign of real mentality: The wasp’s behavior is fundamentally 
different from the nonmaterial human mind, which supports the view that minds are not 
dispersed widely in nature but are far more exclusive and plausibly restricted to humans. In 
contrast, later mechanistic philosophers – such as Wooldridge and Dennett – use the same 
example to claim that as insect intelligence can be shown to be nothing but a complex 
mechanism, the same would presumably apply to the human case (see also McDougall, 1950). 
In particular the link between the wasp’s behavior and computational routines is used to argue 
for a deep similarity between biological behavior and machines. Ultimately, this similarity 
should be extended to humans. So ironically, in both cases, the story can be cast as providing 
a clear theoretical message – even though precisely opposite to one another – that does not 
invite a critical attitude towards the findings related in the story. 
 The second possible explanation that I want to mention derives from empirical 
research on the automatic subjective interpretation of specific stimuli in either causal terms or 
in terms of animacy or agency (Mar & Macrae, 2007; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). A central 
 25 
point here is that the human capacity to differentiate between agents and non-agents already 
operates at a very basic, perceptual and intuitive level and is not a purely intellectual 
judgment. Simple stimuli can be sufficient to evoke the subjective impression of animacy. In 
an intriguing study Barrett and Johnson (2003) also found that stimuli that usually evoked the 
impression of animacy ceased to do so when the stimulus array was placed under control by 
the subject, who could start the display at will. Having control seemed to be a key feature that 
prevented the perceptual experience of animacy. While there are many differences between 
these perceptual cases and the Sphex story, there are also fascinating similarities. The story 
also plays out on an intuitive level. It does not relate a neutral finding, but something 
remarkable that pops up in a salient way. In addition, the story also hinges on an intuitive 
judgment, here whether this wasp is an agent or not. Finally, the key factor that makes the 
wasp switch interpretational categories is precisely that it is brought under complete control 
by the experimenter. These are all good indications that the Sphex story is so intriguing (and 
often repeated) because it plays on very basic and particular, intuitive human tendencies to 
differentiate between agents and non-agents. If this analysis can be shown to be correct, it 
would provide a good explanation for the ongoing repetition of the story – as it plays on deep 
intuitive tendencies – as well as a good reason for its discontinuation.  
 These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and together they provide some working 
ideas for an explanation of the endless repetition of the Sphex story among students of 
behavior and mind. In particular the suggestion that these wasps can be brought under 
complete control and thus lose their agency is a message that may act as a human 
superstimulus as known from ethology: Being larger than ordinary stimuli or situations, they 
are difficult to resist or put down. However, cognitive scientists who are still swayed by the 
story can use the empirical results provided by ethologists and other behavioral scientists that 
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put the Sphex story into its proper perspective. There is no reason for humans to remain stuck 
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